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Abstract
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Introduction

1.1

Motivation

The use of individual-level information is rapidly increasing in many economic and political
environments, from advertising (various forms of targeting) to health insurance (contact and
treatment of patients based on health histories) to electoral campaigns (identifying voters
who are likely to switch or to turn out). In all these environments, the socially e¢ cient
match between individual and “treatment”may require the collection, analysis and di¤usion
of highly personalized data.
A large number of important policy and regulatory questions are beginning to emerge
around the use of personal information. However, to properly frame these questions, we
must …rst understand how markets for personalized information impact the creation and
distribution of surplus, which is the main objective of this paper.
Much of the relevant data is collected and distributed by data brokers and data intermediaries ranging from established companies such as Acxiom and Bloomberg, to more recently
established companies such as Bluekai and eXelate. Perhaps the most prevalent technology
to enable the collection and resale of individual-level information is based on cookies and
related means of recording browsing data. Cookies are small …les placed by a website in a
user’s web browser that record information about the user’s visit. Data providers use several
partner websites to place cookies on user’s computers and collect information. In particular, the …rst time any user visits a partner site (e.g., a travel site), a cookie is sent to her
browser, recording any action taken on the site during that browsing session (e.g., searches
for ‡ights).1 If the same user visits another partner website (e.g., an online retailer), the
information contained in her cookie is updated to re‡ect the most recent browsing history.
The data provider therefore maintains a detailed and up-to-date pro…le for each user, and
compiles segments of consumer characteristics, based on each individual’s browsing behavior.
The demand for such highly detailed, consumer-level information is almost entirely driven
by advertisers, who wish to tailor their spending and their campaigns to the characteristics
of each consumer, patient, or voter.
The two distinguishing features of online markets for data are the following: (a) individual
queries (as opposed to access to an entire database) are the actual products for sale,2 and (b)
1

This type of cookie is known as third-party cookie, because the domain installing it is di¤erent from the website actually visited by the user. Over half of the sites examined in a study by
the Wall Street Journal installed 23 or more third-party cookies on visiting users’ computers. (The
Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, the Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2010.) For a detailed report on “The State of Data Collection on the Web,” see the 2013 Krux Cross Industry Study at
http://www.krux.com/pro/broadcasts/krux_research/CIS2013/.
2
For example, Bluekai and eXelate sell thousands of demographic, behavioral and purchase-intent seg-
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linear pricing is predominantly used.3 In other words, advertisers specify which consumer
segments and how many total users (“uniques”) they wish to acquire, and pay a price
proportional to the number of users. These features are prominent in the market for cookies,
but are equally representative of many markets for personal information.
In all these markets, a general picture emerges where an advertiser acquires very detailed
information about a segment of “targeted” consumers, and is rather uninformed about a
larger “residual”set. This kind of information structure, together with the new advertising
opportunities, poses a number of economic questions. How is the advertisers’willingness to
pay for information determined? Which consumers should they target? How should a data
provider price its third-party data? How does the structure of the market for data (e.g.,
competition among sellers, data exclusivity) a¤ect the equilibrium price of information?
More speci…cally to online advertising markets, what are the implications of data sales for
the revenues of large publishers of advertising space?
In this paper, we explore the role of data providers on the price and allocation of
consumer-level information. We provide a framework that addresses general questions about
the market for data, and contributes to our understanding of recent practices in online advertising. Thus, we develop a simple model of data pricing that captures the key trade-o¤s
involved in selling the information encoded in third-party cookies. However, our model also
applies more broadly to markets for consumer-level information, and it is suited to analyze
several o- ine channels as well.
In our model, we consider heterogeneous consumers and …rms. The (potential) surplus
is given by a function that assigns a value to each realized match between a consumer and a
…rm (the match value function). The match values di¤er along a purely horizontal dimension,
and may represent a market with di¤erentiated products and heterogeneous preferences of
consumers over the product space. In order to realize the potential match value, each …rm
must “invest” in contacting consumers. An immediate interpretation of the investment
decision is advertising spending that generates contacts and eventually sales. We refer to
the advertising technology as the rate at which investment into contacts generates actual
sales.
We maintain the two distinguishing features of selling cookies (individual queries and peruser “bit”pricing) as the main assumptions. These assumptions can be stated more precisely
ments. See http://exelate.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Data-Segments-Overview-013112b.pdf for an
example of the segments for sale.
3
Cookie-based data can be priced in two ways: per stamp (CPS), where buyers pay for the right to
access the cookie, independent of number of uses of the data; and per mille (CPM), where the price of the
data is proportional to the number of advertising impressions shown using that data. Most data providers
give buyers a choice of the pricing criterion. (Data with Bene…ts, Online Metrics Insider, October 25, 2010.
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/158198/#axzz2Z7WyhSoj.)
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as follows: (a) individual queries are for sale: We allow advertisers to purchase information
on individual consumers. This enables advertisers to segment users into a targeted group
that receives personalized levels of advertising, and a residual group that receives a uniform
level of advertising (possibly zero). More formally, this means the information structures
available to an advertiser are given by speci…c partitions of the space of match values. (b)
data bits are priced separately: We restrict the data provider to set a uniform unit price, so
that the payment to the data provider is proportional to the number of users (“cookies”)
acquired.
There exist, of course, other ways to sell information, though linear pricing of cookies is
a natural starting point. We address these variations in extensions of our baseline model.
In particular, we explore alternative mechanisms for selling information, such as bundling
and nonlinear pricing of data. We formally establish conditions under which linear pricing
provides a good approximation for the optimal mechanism.

1.2

Overview of the Results

In Section 3, we characterize the advertisers’ demand for information for a given price of
data. We establish that advertisers purchase information on two convex sets of consumers,
speci…cally those with the highest and lowest match values. Intuitively, advertisers will
not buy information about every consumer. Advertisers must then estimate the match value
within the residual set of consumers, and excluding a convex set allows them to minimize the
prediction error. Furthermore, under quite general conditions, the data-buying policy takes
the form of a single cuto¤ match value. More surprisingly, advertisers may buy information
about all users above the cuto¤ value (positive targeting) or below the cuto¤ value (negative
targeting). Each of these data-buying policies alleviates one potential source of advertising
mismatch, namely wasteful spending on low-value matches and insu¢ cient intensity on highvalue matches. The optimality of positive vs. negative targeting depends on the advertising
technology and on the distribution of match values, i.e., on properties of the completeinformation pro…t function alone.
In Section 4, we turn to the data provider’s pricing problem. We …rst examine the
subtle relationship between the monopoly price and the unit cost of advertising. The cost of
advertising reduces both the payo¤ advertisers can obtain through better information, and
their payo¤ if uninformed. The overall e¤ect on the demand for cookies and on the monopoly
price is, in general, non-monotone. In an informative example, the monopoly price of cookies
is single-peaked in the cost of advertising. This suggests which market conditions are more
conducive to the pro…tability of a data provider.
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We then examine the role of market structure on the price of cookies. Within our
monopoly framework, we explore the possibility of consumers selling their own information. Formally, we consider a continuum of information providers, each one selling one signal
exclusively. Surprisingly, we …nd that concentrating sales in the hands of a single data
provider is not necessarily detrimental to social welfare, and that prices are higher under
fragmentation. The reason for this result is that exclusive sellers are not really competing
in prices. On the contrary, they ignore the negative externality that raising the price of one
signal imposes on the advertisers’ demand for information about all other consumers. A
similar mechanism characterizes the e¤ects of an incomplete database, sold by a single …rm.
In that case, the willingness to pay for information increases with the size of the database,
but the monopoly price may, in fact, decrease.
In Section 5, we enrich the set of pricing mechanisms available to the data provider. In
particular, in a binary-action model, we introduce nonlinear pricing of information structures. We show that the data provider can screen vertically heterogeneous advertisers by
o¤ering subsets of the database at a decreasing marginal price. The optimal nonlinear price
determines exclusivity restrictions on a set of “marginal” cookies: in particular, secondbest distortions imply that some cookies that would be pro…table for several advertisers are
bought by a subset of high-value advertisers only.
Finally, in Section 6, we examine the interaction between the markets for data and online
advertising. In particular, we relate the properties of the advertising technology to the
payo¤ externalities that the price in one market imposes on the seller in the other market.
In addition, these properties determine the publisher’s incentives to acquire information
and to release it to the advertisers. A consistent pattern emerges linking the advertisers’
preferences for positive vs. negative targeting and the degree to which a publisher wishes to
improve the targeting opportunities available to them.

1.3

Related Literature

The issue of optimally pricing information in a monopoly and in a competitive market has
been addressed in the …nance literature, starting with seminal contributions by Admati and
P‡eiderer (1986), Admati and P‡eiderer (1990) and Allen (1990), and more recently by
García and Sangiorgi (2011). A di¤erent strand of the literature has examined the sale of information to competing parties. In particular, Sarvary and Parker (1997) model informationsharing among competing consulting companies; Xiang and Sarvary (2013) study the interaction among providers of information to competing clients; Iyer and Soberman (2000) analyze
the sale of heterogeneous signals, corresponding to valuable product modi…cations, to …rms
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competing in a di¤erentiated-products duopoly; Taylor (2004) studies the sale of consumer
lists that facilitate price discrimination based on purchase history. All of these earlier papers only allowed for the complete sale of information. In other words, they focused on
signals that revealed (noisy) information about all realizations of a payo¤-relevant random
variable. The main di¤erence with our paper’s approach is that we focus on “bit-pricing”of
information, by allowing a seller to price each realization of a random variable separately.
The literature on the optimal choice of information structures is rather recent. Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) consider the design of optimal information structures within
the context of an optimal auction. There, the principal controls the design of both the information and the allocation rule. More recently, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider
the design of the information structure by the principal when the agent will take an independent action on the basis of the received information. Rayo and Segal (2010) examine a
similar question in a model with multidimensional uncertainty and private information on
the agent’s cost of action. In our model, the advertisers’ demand for data is reminiscent
of information acquisition under the rational inattention problem, as in Sims (2003). The
main di¤erence with both the inattention and persuasion literature is that we endogenize
the agent’s information cost parameter by explicitly analyzing monopoly pricing, rather than
directly choosing an information structure.
In related contributions, Anton and Yao (2002), Hörner and Skrzypacz (2012), and
Babaio¤, Kleinberg, and Paes Leme (2012) derive the optimal mechanism for selling information about a payo¤-relevant state, in a principal-agent framework. Anton and Yao
(2002) emphasize the role of partial disclosure; Hörner and Skrzypacz (2012) focus on the
incentives to acquire information; and Babaio¤, Kleinberg, and Paes Leme (2012) allow both
the seller and the buyer to observe private signals. Finally, Ho¤mann, Inderst, and Ottaviani (2013) consider targeted advertising as selective disclosure of product information to
consumers with limited attention spans.
The role of speci…c information structures in auctions, and their implication for online
advertising market design, are analyzed in recent work by Abraham, Athey, Babaio¤, and
Grubb (2012), Celis, Lewis, Mobius, and Nazerzadeh (2012), and Kempe, Syrganis, and
Tardos (2012). All three papers are motivated by asymmetries in bidders’ability to access
additional information about the object for sale. Finally, Mahdian, Ghosh, McAfee, and
Vassilvitskii (2012) study the revenue implications of cookie-matching from the point of
view of an informed seller of advertising space, uncovering a trade-o¤ between targeting and
information leakage.
In our earlier work, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011), we analyzed the impact that exogenous changes in the information structures have on the competition for advertising space.
6

In the present strategic environment, the pricing decision of the data provider and the data
purchasing decision of the advertiser endogenously determined the information structure and
hence the equilibrium level of targeting and advertising.

2
2.1

Model
Matching and Preferences

We consider a unit mass of consumers (or “users”), i 2 [0; 1], and …rms (or “advertisers”),
j 2 [0; 1], a single publisher, and a monopolistic data provider. The consumers and …rms are
each uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Each consumer-…rm pair (i; j) generates a
(potential) match value v : [0; 1] [0; 1] ! V , with V = [v; v] R+ .
The (uniform) distribution over the consumer-…rm pairs (i; j) generates a distribution of
values through the match value function v. For every measurable subset A of values in V ,
we denote the resulting measure by :
(A) ,

Z

didj.

fi;j2[0;1]jv(i;j)2A g

Consider the set of matches that generates a value v or less,
Av , fi; j 2 [0; 1] jv (i; j)

vg.

The associated distribution function F : V ! [0; 1] is de…ned by
F (v) ,

(Av ) .

By extension, we de…ne the conditional measure for every consumer i and every …rm j by:
i

(A) ,

Z

dj, and

fj2[0;1]jv(i;j)2A g

j

(A) ,

Z

di,

fi2[0;1]jv(i;j)2A g

and associated conditional distribution functions Fi (v) and Fj (v). We assume that the
resulting match values are identically distributed across consumer and across …rms, i.e., for
all i, j, and v:
Fi (v) = Fj (v) = F (v) .
Prominent examples of distributions that satisfy our symmetry assumption include: i.i.d.
match values across consumer-…rm pairs; and uniformly distributed …rms and consumers
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around a unit-length circle, where match values are a function of the distance ji jj.
Thus, match values di¤er along a purely horizontal dimension. This assumption captures
the idea that, even within an industry, the same consumer pro…le can represent a high “match
value” to some …rms and at the same time a low “match value” to others. This is clearly
true for consumers that di¤er in their geographical location, but applies more broadly as
well. Consider the case of credit-score data: major credit card companies are interested in
reaching consumers with high credit-worthiness; banks that advertise consumer credit lines
would like to target individuals with average scores, who are cash-constraint, but unlikely
to default; and subprime lenders such as used car dealers typically cater to individuals with
low or non-existing credit scores.4
Firm j must take an action qij 0 directed at consumer i to realize the potential match
value v (i; j). We de…ne q as the match intensity. We abstract from the details of the revenuegenerating process associated to matching with intensity q. The complete-information pro…ts
of a …rm generating a contact of intensity q with a consumer of value v are given by
(v; q) , vq

cm (q) :

(1)

The matching function m : R+ ! R+ is assumed to be increasing, continuously di¤erentiable,
and convex. In the context of advertising, q corresponds to the probability of generating
consumer i’s awareness about …rm j’s product. If consumer i is made aware of the product,
he generates a net present value to the …rm equal to v (i; j). Awareness is generated by
buying advertising space from the publisher, and we assume that advertising space can be
purchased at a constant marginal cost c.
The advertising technology is then summarized by the matching function m (q) that
represents the amount of advertising space m required to generate a match with probability
q and the marginal cost c of advertising space. With the advertising application in mind,
we may view q as scaling the consumer’s willingness to pay directly, or as the amount of
advertising e¤ort exerted by the …rm, which also enters the consumer’s utility function.
Thus, the pro…t function in (1) is consistent with the informative, as well as the persuasive
and complementary views of advertising (see Bagwell, 2007).

2.2

Information and Timing

Initially, neither the advertisers nor the publisher have information about the pair-speci…c
match values v (i; j) beyond the common prior distribution F (v). Each advertiser can purchase information from a monopolist data provider to better target his advertising choices.
4

See Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) for a description and model of subprime lending.
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The data provider has information relating each consumer to a set of characteristics,
represented by the index i. Advertisers can then query the data provider for the “user IDs”
of consumers with speci…c characteristics i. From the perspective of advertiser j, the only
relevant aspect of the characteristic of consumer i is the value of the interaction v (i; j).
Thus, if advertiser j wishes to identify (and contact) all consumers with valuation v, then
he requests the identity of all consumers with characteristics i such that v = v (i; j).
Each advertiser j can purchase information about any subset of consumers with given
set of match values Aj V . We shall hereafter refer to “cookie v”as the characteristics of i
that identify, for advertiser j, all consumers such that v (i; j) = v. Thus, if …rm j purchases
cookie v, then the value v = v (i; j) belongs to the set Aj . Advertisers are able to tailor their
action q to each consumer they acquire cookies about. For this reason, we refer to the sets
Aj and ACj as the targeted set and the residual set (or complementary set), respectively.
We assume that the data about individual consumer is sold at a constant linear price per
cookie. Thus the price of the targeted set Aj is given by
p (Aj ) , p (Aj ) .

(2)

This assumption re‡ects the pricing of data “per unique user” (also known as “cost per
stamp”). It also matches the o- ine markets for data, where the price of mailing lists, or
lists of credit scores is related to the number of user records, and where the data cannot be
bought contextually to its use. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of our model.
Figure 1: Timing

3

Demand for Information

When facing consumer i, each advertiser chooses the advertising intensity qij to maximize
pro…ts, given the expectation of v (i; j). The value of information for each advertiser is
determined by the incremental pro…ts they could accrue by purchasing more cookies. For
the consumers in the targeted set Aj , advertiser j is able to perfectly tailor his advertising
spending to all consumers included in the targeted set Aj . In particular, we denote the
9

complete-information demand for advertising space q (v) and pro…t level

(v) by

q (v) , arg max [ (v; q)] ;
q2R+

(v) ,

(v; q (v)) :

In contrast, each advertiser j must choose a constant level of q for all consumers in the
complement (or residual) set ACj . The optimal level of advertising q (ACj ) depends in principle
on the targeted set Aj . Because the objective (v; q) is linear in v, it is given by
q (ACj ) , arg max [E [ (v; q) j v 62 Aj ]] = q (E [v j v 62 Aj ]) :
q2R+

Therefore, we can formulate each advertiser’s information-acquisition problem as the
choice of a measurable subset A of the set of match values V :
Z
Z
(v; q (AC ))dF (v) ,
(3)
( (v; q (v)) p) dF (v) +
max
A V

AC

A

where by symmetry we can drop the index j for the advertiser.
By including all consumers with match value v into the targeted set A; the advertiser
can improve his gross pro…ts from the uninformed level to the informed level, albeit at the
unit cost p per consumer. In problem (3), the total price paid by the advertisers to the data
provider is then proportional to the measure of the targeted set.
The program formulated in (3) is reminiscent of a rational inattention problem as in Sims
(2003). To be clear, we are not imposing a constraint on any player’s total attention span.
Instead, the limits to attention here are due to a direct monetary cost p, which reduces the
advertisers’incentives to acquire perfect information about all match values. Problem (3)
also shares some features with the Bayesian persuasion literature, e.g., Rayo and Segal (2010)
and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). As in those models, one party (here, the advertiser)
chooses an information structure to maximize a given objective. Another party (here, the
data provider) would like the chosen information structure to be as precise as possible: in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), in order to take a subsequent action; and in our paper, to
maximize pro…ts. In both cases, a wedge (or bias) makes the two parties’ideal information
structures di¤er. In this paper, the wedge is represented by the price of data. For a …xed
p, the two models di¤er because the data provider (our receiver) does not take any action.
However, when we analyze the pricing problem in Section 4, we allow the data provider to
take an action before the advertiser (our sender) chooses an information structure. Thus,
with reference to both the inattention and persuasion literatures, the greatest di¤erence with
10

this paper is that we allow the data provider to choose the information cost (preference bias).
We now seek to characterize the properties of the optimal targeted set, as a function of
the unit price of cookies p and of the cost of acquiring advertising space c. We begin with a
simple example.

3.1

The Binary-Action Environment

We start with linear matching costs and uniformly distributed match values; we then generalize the model to continuous actions and general distributions. Formally, let F (v) = v,
with v 2 [0; 1] and c m (q) = c q, with q 2 [0; 1]. The linear cost assumption is equivalent
to considering a binary action environment, q 2 f0; 1g, as the optimal contact policy will
always be to choose q 2 f0; 1g.
In this simpli…ed version of the model, targeting is very coarse: under complete information, it is optimal to contact a consumer v (i.e., to choose q (v) = 1) if and only if the
match value v exceeds the unit cost of advertising c. Thus, the complete-information pro…ts
are given by
(v) , max fv c; 0g :
(4)
Likewise, the optimal action on the residual set is given by
q (AC ) = 1 () E[v j v 2 AC ]

c:

In this binary setting, advertisers always choose a constant action q 2 f0; 1g on the targeted set A and a di¤erent constant action on the residual set AC : intuitively, information
about consumer v has positive value only if it a¤ects the advertiser’s subsequent action.
Therefore, advertisers adopt one of two mutually exclusive strategies to segment the consumer population: (i) positive targeting consists of buying information on the highest-value
consumers, contacting them and excluding everyone else; (ii) negative targeting consists of
buying information on the lowest-value consumers, avoiding them and contacting everyone
else.
Consider the willingness to pay for the marginal cookie under each targeting strategy. If
the advertiser adopts positive targeting, then he purchases information on (and contacts) all
consumers above a certain threshold. Conversely, if the advertiser adopts negative targeting,
then he purchases all the cookies below a certain threshold. The optimality of a threshold
strategy follows from the monotonicity of the pro…t in v and the binary action environment.
The choice of the optimal targeting strategy and the size of the targeted set naturally depends
on the cost of contact c and on the price of information p. We denote the optimal targeted
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set by A (c; p). This set is de…ned by a threshold value v that either determines a lower
interval [v; v ] or an upper interval [v ; v], depending on the optimality of either negative or
positive targeting, respectively.
In the binary environment, we can explicitly identify the size of the targeted set. If the
advertiser adopts positive targeting, then he purchases information on all consumers up to
the threshold v that leaves him with nonnegative net utility, or v = c + p. Conversely, if
the advertiser adopts negative targeting, then at marginal cookie, the gain from avoiding the
contact, and thus saving c v, is just o¤set by the price p of the cookie, and thus v = c p.
Under either targeting strategy, the advertiser trades o¤ the magnitude of the error made
on the residual set with the cost of acquiring additional information.
The cost of the advertising space, the matching cost c, determines whether positive or
negative targeting is optimal. If c is high, only a small number of high value users are actually
pro…table. For any price p of information, it is then optimal for advertisers to buy only a
small number of cookies and to contact only those with very high values. The opposite
intuition applies when the cost of contact c is very low: almost all users are pro…table,
advertisers only buy a few low valuation cookies v, and exclude the corresponding users.
Proposition 1 (Targeting Strategy)
For all c; p > 0, the optimal targeted set A (c; p) is given by:
A (c; p) =

(

[0; max fc p; 0g] if c < 1=2;
[min fc + p; 1g ; 1] if c 1=2:

Proposition 1 establishes that the residual and the targeted set are both connected sets
(intervals), and that advertisers do not buy information about all consumers. The …rst
result is speci…c to the binary action environment. The latter is a more general implication
of inference about the values in the residual set from the shape of the targeted set. After all,
if the advertiser were to buy (almost) all cookies, then he might as well reduce his cookie
purchases on a small interval, save the corresponding cookie costs, while still selecting the
correct action on the residual set.5
The binary environment illustrates some general features of optimal targeting and information policies. In particular, three implications of Proposition 1 extend to general settings:
(a) the residual set is non-empty; (b) advertisers do not necessarily buy the cookies of high
value consumers; and (c) the cost c of the advertising space guides their strategy. At the
5

The value c = 1=2 of the threshold which determines the choice of targeting strategy happens to coincide
with the threshold value that would determine whether advertisers contact all consumers, or none, in the
absence of cookies. This is a special feature of the uniform distribution.
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same time, the binary environment cannot easily capture several aspects of the model, including the following: the role of the distribution of match values (and of the relative size of
the left and the right tail in particular); the role of precise tailoring and the need for more
detailed information; the determinants of the advertisers’ optimal targeting strategy; and
the e¤ect of the cost of advertising on the demand for information.

3.2

The Continuous-Action Environment

We now proceed to analyze the general version of our model, in which we consider a continuum of actions and a general distribution of match values. It is helpful to …rst describe
the demand for advertising space when the value of the match v is known to the advertisers.
Thus, we introduce the complete-information decision and pro…ts. As speci…ed earlier, we
allow for a general di¤erentiable, increasing and convex cost function m (q). We shall further
assume that m0 (0) = 0, which implies that the complete-information demand for advertising
is positive for all match values.
The complete-information demand for advertising space, denoted by q (v), is characterized by the …rst-order condition
v = cm0 (q (v)) .
(5)
By contrast, if the advertiser has access to the distribution F (v) only, the prior-information
demand for advertising space q is given by
q , q (AC = V ) = q (E [v]) :
More generally, given a targeted set A, the optimal advertising level on the residual set AC
satis…es the following condition:
E[v j v 2 AC ] = cm0 (q (AC )):

(6)

Thus, our continuous-action model has the two key features that advertisers (a) di¤erentiate spending levels within the targeted set, and (b) choose a uniform (strictly positive)
advertising level for the residual set. In turn, the optimal advertising level on the residual set
q (AC ) varies with the composition of the targeted set A. These advertising policies might
arguably represent the choices of a large brand marketer who wishes to …ne-tune spending
on a group of consumers, while adopting “umbrella spending”on everyone else.
Note that the realized complete-information pro…t (v) is strictly convex in v, as q (v)
is strictly increasing, and the objective function (v; q) is linear in v. In contrast, the realized
pro…t under prior information from a consumer with value v is linear in v, and it is given by
13

(v; q). Figure 2 describes the pro…t function under complete information
information (v; q).

(v) and prior

Figure 2: Complete- and Prior-Information Profits
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As intuitive, under prior information, the …rm chooses excessive (wasteful) advertising
to low-value consumers and insu¢ cient advertising to higher-value consumers. The …rm
therefore has a positive willingness to pay for information, i.e., for cookies. The value of
information for every match value v is visually described by the di¤erence between the
complete information and the prior information pro…t function:
(v)

(v; q) :

(7)

Figure 2 suggests that the value of information is highest for extreme match values.6 Consequently, the next result establishes the optimality of a convex residual set of cookies. Each
advertising …rm purchases all cookies in a set A = [v; v1 ] [ [v2 ; v]. The value of the lower
and upper threshold are determined again by c and p, thus v1 , v1 (c; p) and v2 , v2 (c; p),
respectively. Proposition 2 con…rms the intuition that the value of information is lowest for
intermediate match values and highest for match values on the tails.
Proposition 2 (Convexity of Residual Set)
For all c; p > 0, the optimal residual set AC (c; p) is a non-empty interval [v1 (c; p) ; v2 (c; p)].
Proposition 2 allows us to rewrite the …rm’s problem (3) as the choice of two thresholds,
6

In this example, cm (q) = q 2 =2, and F (v) = v, v 2 [0; 1].
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v1 and v2 , that de…ne the targeted and residual sets:
max
v1 ;v2

Z

v2

[p + (v; q ([v1 ; v2 ]))

(v)] dF (v) ;

(8)

v1
0

s.t. cm (q ([v1 ; v2 ])) = E [v j v 2 [v1 ; v2 ]] :
In program (8), as the bounds of the residual set are stretched (e.g., as v1 decreases), the advertiser earns a marginal bene…t of p and incurs a marginal cost of (v1 )
(v1 ; q ([v1 ; v2 ])) :
In addition, the advertiser adjusts the optimal action on the residual set to take the new
inference problem into account. (Of course, this has no …rst-order e¤ect on pro…ts at the optimum.) The average match value E [v j v 2 [v1 ; v2 ]] determines the demand for advertising
space in the residual set q ([v1 ; v2 ]), which in turn a¤ects the value of information.
In the discussion above, we described the value of information above as the di¤erence
between the pro…t of an informed and an uninformed advertiser
(v)
(v; q). This
revenue comparison is conditional on the realization of the value v, and it is thus an ex-post
comparison. For the complete determination of the optimal policy, the advertiser has to
evaluate how large these gains from information are from an ex-ante point of view. The
advertiser therefore has to weigh the likelihood of di¤erent realizations, represented by the
distribution F (v) of values, and the gains from responding to the information, represented
by the convexity of the matching function m (q). To understand the exact nature of these
trade-o¤s, it is useful to begin with a “symmetric”environment for F (v) and m (q). In the
context of negative vs. positive targeting, this corresponds to a symmetric distribution F (v)
around the mean E [v] and a quadratic matching function m (q), such as in the example of
Figure 2.
3.2.1

Joint Targeting: Positive and Negative

When matching costs are quadratic and match values are symmetrically distributed, advertisers always choose to target both low- and high-valuation consumers. In addition, under
these symmetry conditions, the residual set (i.e., the set of excluded valuations) is an interval
centered on the prior mean E [v]. With a quadratic matching function, the optimal complete
information matching intensity is linear in v, or q (v) = v=c. Moreover, the gains from information relative to the optimal matching policy for the mean value q (E [v]) are identical for
values equidistant from the mean, regardless of whether they are below or above the mean.
Of course, the value of information arises from adjustments of the matching intensity relative
to the mean, i.e., increasing the matching intensity for values above the mean and decreasing
the matching intensity for values below the mean. Furthermore, because the curvature of
the cost function is constant in q when m (q) is quadratic, this symmetry argument holds
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under any symmetric distribution F (v). Proposition 3 veri…es the above intuition.
Proposition 3 (Positive and Negative Targeting)
With symmetrically distributed match values and quadratic matching costs, the optimal residual set is given by:
p
p
AC (c; p) = [E [v] 2 cp; E [v] + 2 cp]:
The measure of the residual set is increasing in the product of the price of information p
and the cost of contact c. Thus, an increase in either one depresses the number of cookies
acquired, and shrinks the targeted set by expanding the residual set toward the tails of the
distribution. Figure 3 illustrates the demand for cookies and the resulting pro…t levels in
the quadratic environment.
Figure 3: Positive and Negative Targeting
v
0.5

P ositivetargeting

0.4

0.3

p

0.2

Negativetargeting
0.1

Residual set
p

0.0
0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

v

0.1

The symmetry conditions introduced in Proposition 3 have important implications not
only for the optimal location of the residual set, but also for its size. In particular, the
expected match value in the residual set is equal to the prior mean E[v], regardless of the
measure of the residual set AC . Therefore, the quantity of signals purchased by the advertiser
does not in‡uence the uninformed action q, and hence it does not a¤ect the marginal value
of information. This also implies that the willingness to pay for information about any
consumer v is independent of the distribution of match values.
In turn, the interaction between the symmetric gains from information and the symmetry
in the distribution suggest conditions under which either only positive or only negative
targeting become optimal, as we establish in the next set of results.
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3.2.2

Exclusive Targeting: Positive or Negative

While the residual set is always connected, as established by Proposition 2, the targeted set
may be as well. In particular, the choice of a single (positive or negative) targeting policy
depends on the value of information, and on its monotonicity properties over any interval.
Proposition 4 establishes su¢ cient conditions under which …rms demand cookies in a single
interval, i.e., they choose positive or negative targeting only.
Proposition 4 (Exclusive Targeting)
1. If m00 (q) and f (v) are decreasing, positive targeting is optimal:
A (c; p) = [v2 (c; p) ; v] ; and v2 > v:
2. If m00 (q) and f (v) are increasing, negative targeting is optimal:
A (c; p) = [v; v1 (c; p)] ; and v1 < v:
The su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 4 for exclusive targeting are perhaps best understood when viewed as departures from the symmetric conditions of Proposition 3. If,
say, positive targeting is to dominate negative targeting, then it has to be the case that the
gains from information are larger on the upside than on the downside of values. Recall that
the gains from information given the realization v are equal to
(v)
(v; q). Thus, if
the curvature of the matching function m00 (q) is decreasing, the gains from information for
realizations v equidistant from the mean E [v] are larger above the mean than below. Now,
this pairwise comparison and reasoning could be undone by the relative likelihood of these
two events. Thus, for the su¢ cient conditions, we need to guarantee that the distribution
of values supports this pairwise argument, and hence the corresponding monotonicity requirement on the density f (v). Figure 4 shows the equilibrium pro…t levels under positive
targeting (a) and negative targeting (b).7
The optimality of targeting consumers in a single interval can be traced back to the two
sources of the value of information, i.e., wasteful advertising for low types and insu¢ cient
advertising for valuable consumers. Proposition 4 relates the potential for mismatch risk to
the properties of the match cost function. In particular, when the curvature of the matching
cost function is increasing, it becomes very expensive to tailor advertising to high-value
consumers. In other words, the risk of insu¢ cient advertising is not very high, given the cost
7

In both panels, F (v) = v, v 2 [0; 1] and m (q) = q b =b. In panel (A), b = 3=2, and in panel (B), b = 3.
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Figure 4: Positive or Negative Targeting
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of advertising space. The …rm then purchases cookies related to lower-valued consumers.8
Finally, note that the distribution of match values must a¤ect the targeting decision, as the
advertiser trades o¤ the amount of learning (related to the range of the residual set jv2 v1 j)
with the cost of acquiring the information (related to the probability measure of the targeted
set). After all, the less likely events require a smaller expense in terms of the cost of cookies.

3.3

Empirical Relevance

We conclude the section on the demand for information by discussing the relevance of
positive- and negative-targeting strategies for online advertising. In practice, an advertiser may adopt either or both strategies, and the choice a strategy in any speci…c context
depends on the distribution of consumer values and on the cost of advertising. For instance,
in the market for credit scores, a credit card company may want to acquire the pro…les of
consumers with the lowest scores, and make sure not to reach out to them; or it may select
a small group of high credit-worthiness consumers, and reach out to them more aggressively.
In the context of retail shopping, Pancras and Sudhir (2007) document the widespread use of
both positive and negative targeting by catalogue merchants and manufacturers, and study
the pricing of data by several intermediaries.
More recent studies provide indirect evidence in favor of adopting negative targeting
to exploit the consumers’purchase cycle. For example, in the context of sponsored-search
8

Examples of matching cost functions with concave marginal costs include power functions, m (q) = q a
with a < 2. Examples of convex marginal costs include those derived from the Butters (1977) exponential
matching technology, i.e., m (q) = a ln (1 q) ; with a > 0, and power functions m (q) = q a , with a > 2.
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1.0

v

advertising, Blake, Nosko, and Tadelis (2013) document that eBay obtains a positive return
on investment only for consumers who have not visited the eBay site in the last two months. A
similar pattern for the pro…tability of di¤erent customers also appears in the case of (o- ine)
direct-marketing companies documented by Anderson and Simester (2013). In both contexts,
a cost-e¢ cient strategy for retailers consists of acquiring information about consumers with
recent purchases and appropriately reducing the amount of advertising directed at them.
These consumers are both low-value (at this point in their purchase cycle) and low in number,
relative to the overall population, which makes negative targeting especially pro…table.9
Finally, as real-time bidding makes online data markets more integrated with the advertising exchanges, we can identify two contrasting forces in terms of our model. On the
one hand, the combined sale of data and advertising favors positive targeting by construction. On the other hand, when the cost of the data is tied to the price paid for advertising,
contacting high-value becomes increasingly costly. If targeting through cookies results in a
higher marginal cost of advertising, advertisers may specify lower bids for selected consumer
segments (i.e., adopt negative targeting) in order to reduce their total expenditure.10

4

The Price of Data

We now turn our attention to the optimal price of data, and we examine several aspects
of monopoly pricing for cookies. We begin with the role of the cost c of advertising in the
determination of the price p of cookies, and then we move to the implications of fragmented
data sales and incomplete databases. We highlight the role of the residual set in determining
the willingness to pay for information, and of the ability of the monopolist to in‡uence its
composition.

4.1

Data and Advertising: Complements or Substitutes?

We …rst examine the relationship between the cost of advertising c and the optimal monopoly
price of cookies. For now, we focus our attention on the response of the optimal price p (c)
to changes in the cost c of advertising. We shall analyze the interaction between the data
provider and the publisher in more detail in Section 6.
From the point of view of the advertiser, the data provider and the publisher are part of
9

While advertisers may be able to identify their own repeat shoppers, they need to purchase third-party
information about their competitors’customers who are at a similar stage in their purchase cycle.
10
Interestingly, when advertising and information are sold contextually, negative targeting is explicitly
allowed as a re…nement option by most large providers of advertising space, including Google, Yahoo!, and
Facebook.

19

value chain to match advertiser and consumer. It is therefore tempting to view the interaction
of the data provider and publisher as a vertical chain (formed by strategic complements),
and to associate with it the risk of double marginalization. This would suggest that an
increase in the cost c of advertising would lead optimally to a partially o¤setting decrease in
the price of information p (c). But at closer inspection, the relationship between the price
of data and that of advertising is more subtle.
The purchase of data may allow the advertiser to concentrate the purchase of advertising
space on a smaller but highly relevant segment. Thus, from the point of view of the advertiser,
the data provides an option whose value might be increasing as the advertising space becomes
more expensive. Thus, the purchase of data acts as a strategic complement for the high value
realizations, but as a strategic substitute for the low valuations. After all, after learning of a
low value consumer, the advertiser lowers his matching intensity, and might even set it equal
to zero.
Therefore, by necessity, data purchases act simultaneously as strategic substitutes as well
as complements to advertising purchases. This subtlety in the interaction already appears in
the binary environment that we introduced in Section 3.1 to which we now return. In fact,
the following results are an immediate consequence of Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 (Data and Advertising)
1. For all 0 < c < 1, the monopoly price of a cookie is:
p (c) = (1=2) min fc; 1

cg :

2. The equilibrium sales of cookies are given by the targeted set A (c; p (c)):
(
[0; c=2]
if c < 1=2;
A (c; p (c)) =
[(1 + c) =2; 1] if c 1=2:
3. The equilibrium price, sales and pro…ts of the data provider are single peaked in c.
The data provider induces positive targeting when the cost of advertising c is su¢ ciently
high and negative targeting when the cost of advertising is low. In consequence, the value
of information is highest for intermediate levels of c. As a result, both the price of the
data and the pro…ts of the data provider are non-monotone in c. Intuitively, in the absence
of information, advertisers choose either q0 = 0 or q0 = 1, depending on the cost of the
advertising space c. For very low and very high values of c, the availability of data modi…es
the optimal action only on a limited set of consumers. Consequently, the willingness to pay
for information is also limited.
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The binary-action environment suggests which market conditions are more conducive to
the pro…tability of a data provider. Perhaps contrary to a …rst intuition, niche markets
with a high cost of advertising space and few pro…table consumers are not necessarily the
best environment. While the availability of data would have a large impact (demands for
advertising would be nil without information), the data provider’s pro…ts are constrained by
the low levels of surplus downstream. Instead, markets with relatively large fractions of both
pro…table and unpro…table consumers yield a higher value of information, which translates
into higher prices for data and higher provider pro…ts.
In the following subsections, we take the price of advertising as given, and we focus on the
role of the market structure in the data sector. In Section 6, we take a more comprehensive
look at the interplay of markets for data and advertising. In particular, we derive conditions
under which a data provider and a publisher of advertising space have aligned or con‡icting
interests, and we leverage our results from Section 3 to explore how the data provider can
pro…tably in‡uence the price of advertising.

4.2

Data Sales Fragmentation

We have so far assumed a monopoly structure for the data industry. While the leading …rms
in this industry may currently hold considerable market power, the industry structure is
evolving rapidly. Therefore, we assess the consequences of competition among sellers, and of
the structure of the data industry in general. In particular, we focus on the externalities that
each seller’s price imposes on the other sellers through the composition of the advertisers’
residual set.
Formally, we consider a continuum of data sellers, and we assume that each seller has
exclusive information about one consumer segment i. Thus, each seller sets the price for
one cookie only. This assumption corresponds literally to a market where individual users
are able to sell their own data. It is also very closely related to the business model of the
data exchange, where a data provider does not buy and resell information, but rather o¤ers
a platform for matching individual buyers and sellers, who set their own prices.11
For simplicity, we assume conditions under which positive targeting is optimal, and consider an advertiser’s marginal willingness to pay as a function of the targeted set A = [v2 ; v].
The willingness to pay p (v; v2 ), for a cookie with valuation v < v2 (the inverse demand
11

For a description of integrated sales and separate billing, see Cost vs. Value: Third-Party Targeting Data in the Demand-Side-Platform and Exchange Landscape, Ad Exchanger, February 14th, 2011.
http://www.adexchanger.com/agencies/cost-vs-value. For a more detailed description of the data exchange
model, see http://www.bluekai.com/bluekai-exchange.php.
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function) is given by the di¤erential pro…t with respect to cookie v:
p (v; v2 ) , ( (v; q (v))

(v; q (E [v 0 j v 0

v2 ]))) :

(9)

We look for a symmetric pricing equilibrium in which advertisers choose positive targeting.
We can think of each seller choosing a threshold v to maximize pro…ts given the advertisers’
purchasing strategy, and all other sellers’prices, which are summarized by the threshold v2 .
Thus, a symmetric equilibrium cuto¤ solves the following problem:
v2 = arg max [p (v; v2 ) (1
v

F (v))] .

The key di¤erence with the monopoly problem lies in the residual advertising intensity
q (E [v 0 j v 0 v2 ]) ; which cannot be in‡uenced by the price of any individual seller. More
precisely, suppose the monopolist were to consider an expansion in the supply of cookies,
and hence a lowering of the threshold v2 . By expanding the supply, he would reduce the
gap between complete and prior information pro…ts for the marginal consumer v2 . Naturally
then, the monopolist would have to lower the price. But at the same time, the composition
of the residual set will have changed. In fact, the average value on the residual set will
have decreased, and thus the advertising level on the residual set will be lower. But this
means that the value of information for the marginal consumer just below the targeted set
has increased, and hence the marginal buyer just below the threshold will have a higher
value of information. Now, this e¤ect provides an additional incentive to lower prices and
expand supply for the monopolistic data provider. But competing sellers do not internalize
the positive externality present across cookie sales. Higher prices under fragmented data
sales are then due to the lack of a strong compensating e¤ect.
The fragmented data sales is illustrative of a more general result. Suppose we were
to consider n symmetric data sellers, each holding information about a measure 1=n of
consumers distributed identically according to F (v). The n sellers set prices simultaneously.
Consider now the trade-o¤ facing a speci…c seller. She knows that, by lowering her price,
all advertisers will purchase more from her, as well as from everyone else. This occurs
because the action on the residual set will decrease, if only slightly. However, as for the case
of fragmented sales, the compensation e¤ect is attenuated in equilibrium by the fact that
all other sellers are holding their prices …xed. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium the price
is increasing in n: As the number of sellers grows large, the equilibrium price approaches
the price under fragmentation, where the action on the residual set is constant. When we
contrast the equilibrium price with the case of a data monopolist, we obtain the following
comparison.
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Proposition 6 (Equilibrium under Data Fragmentation)
1. The symmetric equilibrium price of cookies with a continuum of data sellers p is higher
than the monopoly price p .
2. The symmetric equilibrium price with n independent and exclusive data sellers p (n)
is increasing in n, and approaches p as n ! 1.
Clearly, if many sellers would lead to duplication in the datasets, sellers would only be
able to capture the incremental value of their information, thus driving prices down. In
particular, there will exist a critical level of duplication for which the monopoly and the
oligopoly prices are equal.

4.3

Reach of the Database

So far, we implicitly assumed that the monopolist’s dataset covers all consumers, i.e., that
it has maximal reach. We now explore the implications of limited reach on the monopoly
price of cookies, and on the equilibrium pro…ts of the data provider and the advertisers.
We assume that the data provider owns information about a fraction < 1 of all consumers. Advertisers know the distribution of match values of consumers present in the
database, and of those outside of it. For simplicity, we further assume that the two distributions are identical, so that the measure of consumers in the dataset is given by F (v). Of
course, in real-world data markets, consumers in a database may have di¤erent characteristics from those outside of it, and the presence of a cookie on a given consumer is informative
per se.
Proposition 7 (Reach and Demand)
Assume exclusive (positive or negative) targeting is optimal. Then the advertisers’marginal
willingness to pay p (A; ) is increasing in for all A.
Intuitively, the availability of more data improves the monopolist’s pro…ts. The more
surprising part of the result is that demand for information shifts out as more consumers are
reached by the database. The reason behind this result can be traced back to the e¤ects of
a larger database on the optimal action in the residual set q (AC ). When positive targeting
is optimal (so that A = [v2 ; v]), the average type in the residual set AC is given by
E[v j v 2 AC ] = E [v j v
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v2 ] + (1

) E [v] .

(10)

Because the average type is decreasing in for all A, the quantity of advertising demanded
on the residual set is decreasing in . Thus, the willingness to pay for information on the
marginal consumer v2 increases. A similar argument applies to the case of negative targeting.
This result does not, however, imply that the monopolist wishes to raise prices as the
reach increases. On the contrary, Proposition 8 identi…es su¢ cient conditions under which
a database with a wider reach is sold at a lower unit price.
Proposition 8 (Reach and Monopoly Price)
Suppose the matching costs are quadratic and values v are distributed according to F (v) = v ;
with v 2 [0; 1] and 2 (0; 1). If exclusive targeting is optimal, then the monopoly price p ( )
is strictly decreasing in the reach .
As the reach of the database increases, the optimal monopoly price is pushed lower by
two e¤ects. First, the willingness to pay for any targeted set increases (Proposition 7), which
makes raising price and restricting supply more costly. Second, the optimal action in the
residual set is now more sensitive to the price of cookies. This is due to the compensating
e¤ect: the average consumer outside the targeted set becomes less likely to have a high match
value; as a consequence, the quantity of advertising demanded on the residual set decreases
faster as the targeted set expands. Both these e¤ects induce the monopolist to lower price
and expand supply as the database becomes less limited.
Two …nal remarks are in order. First, a reduction in price implies an increase in the
range of data sold by the monopolist [v2 ; v] as the reach increases. Therefore, an increase
in the reach leads to higher data sales. Thus advertisers pay a lower price and access more
information, which implies that their pro…ts increase. This means that an increase in data
availability can induce a Pareto improvement in the market for information.12
Second, note that the price of information is not necessarily continuous or monotone in
the reach parameter . In particular, jumps may occur when the targeting policy induced
by the monopolist switches from joint (both positive and negative) targeting for low reach
values to exclusive (positive or negative) targeting for high reach values .

5

Beyond Linear Pricing

We have focused so far on a fairly speci…c set of information structures (cookies-based) and
pricing mechanisms (linear prices). We now generalize our analysis of data sales to address
two closely related questions: (i) What is the optimal mechanism to sell information in
12

In Section 6, we address the e¤ect of higher data sales on the market for advertising.
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our environment? (ii) Are there conditions under which pricing of individual cookies can
implement the optimal mechanism?
Up to now, we assumed that the advertisers are symmetric in the distribution of the
match values. Moreover, the advertisers attached the same willingness to pay to a consumer
with match value v. Thus, from an ex-ante point of view, the advertisers are all identical, and
their common ex ante value of information is assumed to be known to all market participants,
including the data provider. Therefore, it is as if the data provider has complete information
about the preferences of the advertisers. Now, in this precise setting, a data provider who
could choose among unrestricted information and pricing policies would be able to extract
the entire ex ante surplus from the advertisers. In particular, he could charge a bundle price
for the entire database equal to the ex-ante value of information.
However, the assumption of complete information appears to be too strong in the world
of “big data” where advertisers are heterogeneous. In this section, we shall therefore allow
for a private-information component in the advertisers’willingness to pay to match with a
consumer with characteristics v. Thus, we consider advertisers who di¤er in their marginal
willingness to pay, denoted by 2 = [0; 1]. Extending the earlier expression (1), the net
value of a match is now given by:
(v; q; ) , vq

c m (q) :

The marginal willingness to pay is private information to each advertiser and is distributed
in the population of advertisers according to a continuous distribution function G ( ) with
density g ( ). For this section, we return to the binary decision environment of Section 3.1,
and restrict attention to binary decisions q 2 f0; 1g of the advertiser (or alternatively linear
matching cost m (q) = q). The net value of a match is then given by, extending the earlier
expression (4):
(v; ) , max f v c; 0g :
Thus, for advertising to generate positive value, the realization of must exceed c as v 2 [0; 1].
We now explore the data provider’s ability to screen advertisers by o¤ering di¤erent
information policies, and by pricing the amount of information in a nonlinear way. We begin
our analysis with noiseless information policies and characterize the optimal mechanism
within the class of noiseless information structures. In fact, we can establish that noiseless
information policies remain optimal even when we consider arbitrary information structures.
This result requires substantial additional language and notation for general information
structures that go beyond those used in the main text, and is thus relegated to the Appendix
B.
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With binary actions, the socially e¢ cient information policy can be induced by a threshold v ( ) that informs advertisers perfectly and without noise about the match value v if
and only if v exceeds the threshold v ( ) given by:
c
v ( )= .

(11)

In other words, the data provider can attain the e¢ cient allocation of information through an
information policy based on cookies. Under the e¢ cient information policy, each advertiser
receives information about every realization of v such that v v ( ). Each advertiser would
then adopt positive targeting, i.e., contact all consumers it receives a signal about, and
ignore the residual users. The expected gross value of the e¢ cient information policy for an
advertiser with willingness to pay is:
w ( ),

Z

1

( v

c) dF (v) :

c

Now consider an arbitrary noiseless information policy with threshold x. The value of
this information structure to an advertiser with willingness to pay is given by:
w ( ; x) ,

Z

1

( v

c) dF (v) :

(12)

x

Note the submodularity property of w ( ; x), namely that @ 2 w ( ; x) =@ @x = v < 0. Therefore, any implementable information policy leads to more data, and hence lower thresholds
x, being assigned to advertisers with higher willingness to pay . Given the noiseless nature
of the information policy, the above problem (12) is akin to a nonlinear pricing problem,
where the quantity variable is the amount of information, or the number of cookies sold.
In the associated direct revelation mechanism, each advertiser communicates his willingness to pay, and in exchange is o¤ered a set of cookies and a price for the bundle of cookies.
The set of cookies is determined by the threshold v ( ) and hence the associated quantity
of cookies is
Q ( ) , 1 F (v ( )) ;
and we denote the transfer payment in the direct mechanism by T ( ). As in the standard
analysis of revenue-maximizing mechanisms, we impose a regularity condition such that the
local incentive conditions generate the requisite monotone allocation, which in this context
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is simply the requirement that the “virtual utility”
1

G( )
g( )

(13)

is increasing in . We maintain this restriction for the remainder of this section.
Proposition 9 (Information Policy)
The optimal information policy involves a noiseless information policy with threshold v ( )
given by:
c
v ( )=
.
(14)
1 G( )
g( )

Perhaps the surprising element in the determination of the information policy is that the
distributional information about the match values (i.e., f (v) or F (v)) does not appear in
the description of the optimal information policy. This results from the additivity of the
utility of all types in the number of user contacts, i.e., di¤erences in willingness to pay
originate from the match values v only.
The direct mechanism establishes some key properties of the information policy. In
particular, T ( ) and Q ( ) are strictly increasing in , as shown in Proposition 10.1. But a
related, indirect mechanism speaks more directly to the problem of data selling and access
to the database. Namely, the data provider could specify a nonlinear pricing scheme, or
conversely a price for incremental access to the database. With Q ( ) strictly increasing in
, we can de…ne a nonlinear pricing scheme, which associates every quantity Q with the
transfer of the corresponding type Q 1 ( ):
P (Q) , T Q

1

( ) .

We de…ne the price p (Q) as the price for incremental access to the database, or the marginal
price that we can readily interpret as the price of an additional cookie:
p (Q) , P 0 (Q) .
We can then establish, under slightly stronger regularity conditions than (13), that the
incremental pricing p (Q) implements the direct mechanism as an indirect mechanism. In
fact, the data provider o¤er access to additional cookies at a declining price that mirrors the
logic of quantity discounts as in Maskin and Riley (1984).
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Proposition 10 (Prices and Quantities)
1. The number of cookies sold, Q ( ) and the transfer T ( ) are increasing in .
2. The incremental cookie price p (Q) is decreasing in Q and decentralizes the direct optimal mechanism if (1 G ( )) =g ( ) is decreasing.
Thus, the data provider can decentralize the optimal direct mechanism by allowing advertisers to access a given portion of the database, with volume discounts for those who
demand a larger amount of cookies. This establishes an equivalent implementation of the
optimal mechanism, based on advertiser self-selection of a subset of cookies. In this sense, we
can view linear prices as simple approximations to the optimal mechanism in this particular
case.13

6

Interaction between Data and Advertising Markets

We …nally return to linear pricing of cookies in order to examine the interaction between
the markets for data and online advertising. We seek to assess (a) the e¤ect of the price
of data p on the advertising publisher’s revenue, and (b) the e¤ect of the unit price of
advertising c on the data provider’s revenue. Understanding these cross-market externalities
will allow us to study the data provider’s pricing problem in richer scenarios. In particular,
in Section 6.2, we consider the monopoly price of cookies when the unit price of advertising
is determined endogenously; and in Section 6.3, we let the data provider sell cookies either
to the advertisers or to the publisher, and we determine which side of the advertising market
yields higher pro…ts.14

6.1

Demand for Advertising

The e¤ect of the price of information on the total demand for advertising space and the
impact of the cost of advertising on the demand for data are unclear a priori. For instance,
the total demand for advertising space may increase or decrease in the amount of information
available to advertisers, depending on whether the data is used for positive or negative
targeting. Likewise, a lower marginal cost of advertising space increases the advertisers’
13

See Rogerson (2003) for bounds on the loss in pro…ts from simpler mechanisms such as linear pricing.
In the online advertising industry, sellers often purchase third-party data. For example, The Economist
acquires Bizo Private Audience Targeting through the BlueKai Data Exchange, in order to enable demographic targeting (http://www.economist.com/cookies-info). In Australia, Yahoo! uses Acxiom’s o- ine data
to improve its online targeting ability (http://www.acxiom.com/press-releases/2012/acxiom-announces-…rstquarter-results/).
14
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downstream surplus, but it also decreases the value of information by reducing the cost of
advertising to the residual set.
To formalize these trade-o¤s, consider the total demand for advertising space as a function
of the targeted set A (c; p). Because any advertiser who wishes to generate match intensity
q with a consumer must purchase an amount of space equal to m (q), the total demand for
advertising is given by
M (A) ,

Z

m (q (v)) dF (v) +

Z

m(q (AC ))dF (v) .

(15)

AC

A

We are interested in the e¤ect of the amount of data sold (A) on the total demand for
advertising M (A). Suppose for now that negative targeting is optimal, i.e., the residual
set is given by AC (c; p) = [v1 ; v] for some threshold v1 (c; p) > v. As the price of data
increases, v1 decreases and the publisher replaces m (q (v1 )) with m (q ([v1 ; v])), which is
higher. At the same time, the average match value E [v j v v1 ] decreases, thus reducing
the match intensity with every consumer in the residual set. Figure 5 compares the demand
for advertising m (q (v)) for …xed targeted and residual sets, under two di¤erent matching
cost functions.
Figure 5: Total Demand for Advertising
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We again relate the determinants of the demand for information to the properties of the
complete-information demand for advertising. The total demand for advertising (i.e., the
area under the solid lines in Figure 5) is increasing in the measure of the targeted set A when
the complete-information demand for advertising is convex in v. Figure 5 therefore helps to
clarify the e¤ect of the marginal cost of advertising c on the data provider’s revenue. Suppose
29

v

the unit cost of advertising space c increases. Everything else constant, this induces advertisers to reduce their demand for advertising space. In particular, if the complete-information
demand for advertising is convex in v, a reduction in the amount of data purchased reduces
the total advertising expenditure. Thus, when c increases, advertisers’marginal willingness
to pay for advertising decreases and so does the revenue of the data provider.
Proposition 11 formalizes the interaction of the data and advertising markets by relating
the nature of the cross-market externalities to the properties of the matching cost function.
Proposition 11 (Market Interaction)
Assume exclusive (positive or negative) targeting is optimal.
1. If m0 (q) is log-concave, then the data provider’s revenue is decreasing in c, and the
publisher’s revenue is decreasing in p.
2. If m0 (q) is log-convex, then the data provider’s revenue is increasing in c, and the
publisher’s revenue is increasing in p.
In the proof of Proposition 11, we show that convexity of the complete-information
demand for advertising is equivalent, in terms of the primitives of our model, to the logconcavity of the marginal cost of matching. In turn, log-concavity and log-convexity of m0 (q)
are su¢ cient to establish the sign of the cross-market externality. Finally, the conditions in
Proposition 11 are related to the optimality of positive vs. negative targeting (see Proposition
4). In particular, positive targeting requires convexity of q (v), while negative cross-market
externalities require convexity of the composite function m (q (v)). Thus, the optimality of
positive targeting implies negative cross-market externalities, but not vice-versa.

6.2

Endogenous Cost of Advertising

We now leverage our results on market interaction to assess how the monopoly price of
cookies responds to competition in the “downstream”market for advertising. We introduce
a …xed supply of space M for each user i. This may correspond to a limit on the actual
physical space on web pages that the user can access, or to a limit on the user’s attention
span.
We consider a game in which the data provider sets the price of cookies, advertisers
buy information, and then compete for a …xed supply of advertising space. In equilibrium,
the prices of cookies and advertising space are such the data provider and the advertisers
maximize pro…ts, and the advertising market clears. In other words, the equilibrium price
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of advertising c (p; M ) satis…es the following market-clearing condition,
M=

Z

A(c;p)

m (q (v)) dF (v) +

Z

m(q (AC (c; p)))dF (v)

AC (c;p)

By controlling the price of cookies p, the data provider can pro…tably in‡uence the total
demand for advertising, thus a¤ecting the equilibrium price of advertising and hence the
demand for cookies. We now apply our earlier results, and compare the monopoly price of
cookies under exogenous and endogenous prices of advertising space.
Consider the case of convex complete-information demand for advertising. In this case,
the price of advertising imposes a negative externality on the data provider. Thus, compared
to the case of an exogenous c, the data provider wishes to reduce congestion downstream
in order to keep the equilibrium price c low. Because demand for advertising space is
decreasing in p, the data provider must raise its price.
Now consider the opposite case of concave complete-information demands. We know
the data provider wishes to keep c high in order to increase the demand for information.
However, the total demand for advertising is now increasing in p: Again, the monopolist
data provider wishes to raise the price of data, compared to the case of exogenous cost of
advertising.
To summarize, while the cross-market payo¤ externalities depend on the matching cost
function, the strategic implications of downstream competition for the data provider are
more clear: under the su¢ cient conditions of Proposition 11, the data provider pro…tably
increases the price of cookies in response to …ercer competition for advertising space. In
turn, an increase in the price of data may bene…t the publisher of the advertising space. This
occurs when returns to advertising decrease su¢ ciently fast that the complete-information
advertising demand is concave in v. We now explore the role of the matching technology
when we allow the data provider to choose between selling information to the advertisers or
to the publisher.

6.3

Selling Cookies to the Publisher

The previous discussion highlighted the possibility that online publishers bene…t from the
direct sale of information to the advertisers. A fortiori, the publisher may bene…t from
the indirect sale of information, i.e., from purchasing cookies and releasing match-value
information to the advertisers. Proposition 11 identi…ed conditions under which the demand
of advertising space is increasing in the amount of data sold (A).
We now restrict attention to technologies for which the publisher has a positive value of
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information (i.e., we assume m (q (v)) is convex). We characterize the price of information
that the data provider can charge to either side of the advertising market. In our framework,
all cookies are symmetric from the point of view of the publisher, and its revenue is linear
in the measure of cookies bought. Therefore, the publisher’s marginal willingness to pay for
data is constant, and it is given by
p = c M (V ) ;
where V = [v; v] and the total advertising demand M ( ) is de…ned in (15). Thus, the data
provider faces a ‡at demand curve when selling to the publisher, and a downward-sloping
demand curve when selling to the advertisers. In Figure 6, we compare the data provider’s
pro…ts as a function of the “target buyers” as we vary the matching cost function. In
particular, we consider uniformly distributed match values and power cost functions m (q) =
q b =b. In this example, as b increases, the marginal returns to advertising decline faster.
Figure 6: Selling to Either Side
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Figure 6 then suggests that the publishers have a higher willingness to pay for data when
the marginal returns to advertising are fairly high. Conversely, if the decline in the marginal
returns is steep (so that complete-information demands are nearly linear in v), the publisher’s
willingness to pay is low, and the data provider prefers selling information to the advertisers.

7

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have explored the sale of individual-level information in a setting that
captures the key economic features of the market for third-party data. Speci…cally, in our
model, a monopolistic data provider determines the price to access informative signals about
32

each consumer’s preferences.
Our …rst set of results characterized the demand for such signals by advertisers who wish
to tailor their spending to the match value with each consumer. We showed how properties of the complete-information pro…t function determine the optimality of an informationpurchasing strategy that achieves positive targeting, negative targeting, or both. Turning to
monopoly pricing of cookies, we established that the ability to in‡uence the composition of
the advertisers’targeted and residual sets was the key driver of the optimal (linear) prices.
As a consequence, both the reach of the monopolist’s database and the concentration of data
sales provide incentives to lower prices.
We considered an environment in which advertisers di¤er in their willingness to pay, and
we showed that cookies-based pricing can be part of an (approximate) optimal mechanism
for the sale of information. In particular, we showed that the data provider can decentralize
the optimal mechanism by o¤ering a nonlinear pricing schedule for cookies.
Finally, we explored the interaction between the markets for data and advertising. We
obtained conditions under which the price in each market has a negative impact on the
seller’s pro…ts in the other market, and we showed that the publisher of advertising can, but
need not, bene…t from large data sales.
We, arguably, made progress towards understanding basic aspects of data pricing and
data markets. We did so by making a number of simplifying assumptions. A more comprehensive view of data markets would require a richer environment. In the present model,
neither the advertiser nor the publisher had access to any information about the consumers.
In reality, advertisers and (more prominently) large publishers and advertising exchanges
maintain databases of their own. Thus, the nature of the information sold, and the power
to set prices depends on the allocation of information across market participants. An interesting question in this context is related to the e¤ects of privacy regulation (e.g., banning
the sale of information) on the allocative e¤ects of information markets.
Moreover, online data transactions are inherently two-sided. Presently, we analyzed the
price charged by the data provider to the advertisers. But there are cost of acquiring the
data, either from individuals, publisher or advertisers. Ultimately, the cost of acquiring
information for the data provider should be related to the value of privacy, which might
limit the availability of data, or at least raise its price.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the advertisers’ optimal action on the residual set is
given by q (AC ) = 0. The value of the marginal cookie is then given by max f0; v cg,
which is increasing in v. We show that the value of information is strictly monotone in v.
Notice that adding higher-v cookies to the targeted set does not change the optimal action
on the residual set, because it lowers the expected value of a consumer v 2 AC . Thus, if
advertisers buy cookie v, they also buy all cookies v 0 > v. Conversely, if the optimal action
on the residual set is given by q (AC ) = 1, the value of the marginal cookie is max f0; c vg.
By a similar argument, the value of information is strictly decreasing in v: if advertisers buy
cookie v, they also buy all cookies v 0 < v.
Now consider the advertiser’s pro…ts under positive and negative targeting. In the former
case, the advertisers’pro…ts are given by

+

(c; p) , max
v

Z

1

(v

c

p) dF (v) =

v

Z

1

p) dF (v) :

(v

c

(v

c) dF (v)

c+p

In the latter case, pro…ts are given by
(c; p) , max
v

Z

1

(v

c) dF (v)

pF (v) =

v

Z

1

pF (c

p) :

c p

Now consider the di¤erence
+

(c; p)

(c; p) = p (F (c

p) + F (c + p)

1)

Z

c+p

(v

c) dF (v) :

(16)

c p

Under the uniform distribution, the second term in (16) is nil, while the …rst is equal to
p (2c 1), which establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose towards a contradiction that the optimal residual set
AC is not an interval. Let q0 = q (AC ) denote the match intensity with all consumers in
the residual set. By equation (6), we know q0 is the optimal match intensity for the average
type vA = E [v j v 62 A]. Suppose vA 2 A. Now consider two consumers with v 00 > v 0 and
q (v 00 ) > q (v 0 ) > q0 such that the …rm buys cookie v 0 but not v 00 . If AC is not an interval,
either such a pair exists, or there exists a pair with v 00 < v 0 and q (v 00 ) < q (v 0 ) < q0 such
that the …rm buys cookie v 0 but not v 00 . Consider the former case, and compute the change
in pro…ts obtained by swapping cookies, i.e., purchasing (an equal number of) cookies v 00
instead of cookies v 0 . De…ne the di¤erence between complete and incomplete-information
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pro…ts as
(v; q0 ) = v (q (v)

q0 )

c (m (q (v))

m (q0 )) ;

and notice that v (v; q0 ) = (q (v) q0 ) : Therefore q (v 00 ) > q (v 0 ) > q0 implies (v 00 ; q0 ) >
(v 0 ; q0 ). Because the advertiser gains (v 00 ; q0 ) and loses (v 0 ; q0 ), it follows that the swap
strictly improves pro…ts. An identical argument applies to the case of q (v 00 ) < q (v 0 ) < q0 .
Finally, if vA 62 A, then a pro…table deviation consists of not purchasing vA : advertisers
avoid paying a positive price, and the optimal action on the residual set does not change.
Proof of Proposition 3. If costs are quadratic, so are the complete-information pro…ts.
By symmetry of the distribution, v0 = E [v j v 2 [v0 "; v0 + "]] for any " > 0: The marginal
value of information is then given by
p (v) =

(v)

(vq (v0 )

cm (q (v0 ))) = (v0

v)2 =4c:

Solving for v0 yields the optimal residual set as a function of p and c.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the necessary conditions for the optimal residual set
AC to be given by an interior interval [v1 ; v2 ]. Denote the expected value of v on the residual
set by
v0 , E[v j v 2 AC ].
It follows that q0 , q (AC ) = q (v0 ), and by the envelope theorem q0 = 0 (v0 ). The marginal
value of information at v is then given by (v) ( (v0 ) + (v v0 ) 0 (v0 )), and its derivative
0
with respect to v is given by 0 (v)
(v0 ). Optimality of an interior residual set requires
that the marginal value of information is equal to p at the two extremes i.e.,
Z

v2

( 0 (v)

0

(v0 )) dv = 0:

v1

Under concavity of

0

(v), however, we have

Z

Z

v2
0

( (v)

0

(v0 )) dv

v1

v2
00

(v0 ) (v

v0 ) dv;

v1

which is nonpositive if f (v) is nondecreasing. This implies negative targeting. A similar last
step implies positive targeting.
Finally, we relate the curvature of the pro…t function to that of the match cost function.
The envelope theorem implies 0 (v) = q (v), and implicit di¤erentiation of the …rst order

35

condition yields
00

(v) =

cm00

1
:
(q (v))

Because q (v) is strictly increasing, we conclude that

000

(v) > 0 if and only if m000 (q) < 0.

Proof of Proposition 5. (1.) We know from Proposition 1 that advertisers choose the
following targeted set:
A (c; p) =

(

[0; max fc p; 0g] if c < 1=2;
[min fc + p; 1g ; 1] if c 1=2:

(17)

Thus, under the uniform distribution, the monopoly price of cookies is given by
p (c) =

(

arg maxp [p (c p)]
if c < 1=2;
arg maxp [p (1 c p)] if c 1=2;

and therefore p (c) = (1=2) min fc; 1 cg.
(2.) It follows from (17) that A (c; p (c)) = [0; c=2] if c < 1=2 and A (c; p (c)) = [(1 c) =2; 1]
if c 1=2.
(3.) The single-peakedness of prices p (c), sales (A (c; p (c))), and hence pro…ts, is immediate from parts (1.) and (2.).
Proof of Proposition 6. (1.) Let
p (v; x) =

(v)

(v; q (E [v < x])) :

Under monopoly, the data provider’s chooses the marginal cookie v2 to solve the following
problem:
max [p (v; v) (1 F (v))] :
v

The optimal v2 is then given by the solution v to the following …rst-order condition:
p (v; v) f (v) + @p (v; v) =@v + @p (v; v) =@x = 0:
Conversely, in the symmetric equilibrium with a continuum of sellers, the equilibrium marginal cookie v2 is given by the solution v to the following condition
p (v; v) f (v) + @p (v; v) =@v = 0:
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However,
@p (v; v2 )
=
@x

@ (v; q (E [v < x])) @q @E [v < x]
< 0;
@q
@v
@x

because q (v) is strictly increasing in v, and therefore @ (v; q) =@q > 0 for all q < q (v) :
Therefore, the price under competition p , p (v2 ; v2 ) is higher than the monopoly price
p , p (v2 ; v2 ).
(2.) We look for a symmetric equilibrium in the price-setting game with n data providers.
Let pj = p2 for all j 6= 1 and characterize the advertisers’demand as a function of (p1 ; p2 ).
If positive targeting is optimal, advertisers buy cookies v 2 [v1 ; v] from seller j = 1 and
v 2 [v2 ; v] from sellers j 6= 1. In particular, the thresholds (v1 ; v2 ) satisfy the following
equations:
(v1 )

(v1 ; q (^
v )) = p1

(v2 )

(v2 ; q (^
v )) = p2 ,

where

E [v j v < v1 ] + (n 1) E [v j v < v2 ]
:
n
Note that p1 > p2 implies v1 > v2 . Now rewrite the pro…t function of seller j = 1 as
v^ (p1 ; p2 ) =

1

= ( (v1 )

(v1 ; q (^
v ))) (1

At a symmetric equilibrium where vj
( (v1 )

(v1 ; q (^
v )))

f (v1 )
=
1 F (v1 )

F (v1 )) :

v, the …rst-order condition of seller 1 is given by
0

@ (v1 ; q (v))
@v1

(v1 )

@^
v dq (^
v ) @ (v1 ; q (v))
:
@v1 d^
v
@q

Notice that both dq (^
v ) =d^
v and @ (v1 ; q (v)) =@q on the right-hand side are positive. Therefore, because
@v
1 @E [v j v < v1 ]
=
@v1
n
@v
is decreasing in n, the symmetric equilibrium threshold v (n) is increasing in n, and so is
the price p (n).
Proof of Proposition 7. Under positive targeting, the marginal willingness to pay p (v; )
for a targeted set A = [v; v] is given by
p (v; ) ,

(v)
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(v; q0 (v; )) ;

where
q0 (v; ) , q ( EF [v 0 j v 0 < v] + (1

) EF [v 0 ]) :

The derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to the reach
@p (v; )
=
@

(v

cm0 (q0 (v; ))) q 0 ( ) (EF [v 0 j v 0 < v]

is given by

EF [v 0 ]) :

(18)

The …rst two terms in (18) are positive: pro…ts (v; q0 ) are increasing in q because q0 (v; ) <
q (v); the complete information quantity q ( ) is strictly increasing; and di¤erence of the
conditional and unconditional expected values is negative. Therefore, the marginal willingness to pay p (v; ) is increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 8. Under the quadratic matching costs and distributional assumption (F (v) = v , < 1), the inverse demand p (v; ) for a targeted set A = [v; v] can be
written as
2
1 1
v (1
+ )
p (v; ) =
:
2c
1+
Therefore, the monopolist maximizes
(v; ) , 1

v

p (v; ) :

The …rst-order condition @ =@v = 0 can be solved for the inverse function
given by
(1 + ) 2 v (2 + ) + v 1
.
(v) =
2 (1 v ) + (1 v)v 1
Di¤erentiating with respect to v; one obtains that
v > v^ ( ) ,

(v), which is

(v) is decreasing in v if

2 (1
2+

1

)

:

Substituting v = v^ ( ) into
(v) one obtains
(^
v ( )) > 1 for all
2 (0; 1). Thus,
v ( ; ) > v^ ( ), which in turn implies (v) is decreasing. Furthermore, substituting (v)
into the inverse demand, we obtain the monopoly price as a function of the optimal range v,
2 2

p (v;

(v)) = 2

v

1

v

(1 + )2 ( 2v + v (2v

2

(1

v) ))2

:

Finally, one can show that the sign of the total derivative dp (v; (v)) =dv depends on the
sign of 1 +
v + v , which is positive for all ( ; v) 2 [0; 1]2 . Therefore, the optimal
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range v is decreasing in

and so is the monopoly price.

Proof of Proposition 9. Starting with the value of information w ( ; x) given in (12), we
have
@w ( ; x)
= ( x c) f (x) ,
(19)
@x
with
Z 1
@w ( ; x)
vdF (v) ,
=
@
x
and hence

@ 2 w ( ; x)
= xf (x) .
(20)
@ @x
Because of this submodularity property, higher types should receive lower cuto¤s x:
The optimal information allocation and pricing can then be solved via the virtual utility,
and is given by:
@w ( ; x)
1 G ( ) @ 2 w ( ; x)
=
;
@x
g( )
@x@
and after using (19) and (20) we obtain the result in (14).
Proof of Proposition 10. (1.) It follows immediately from the derivation of the optimal
threshold (14) that the quantity of cookies sold, Q ( ), is increasing, given that the virtual
utility
(1 G ( )) =g ( ) is increasing in . We can derive the associated transfer rule
from the gross utility of the buyer:
w ( ; x ( )) =

Z

1

vdF (v)

x( )

c

Z

1

dF (v) :

(21)

x( )

After all, the indirect utility in any incentive compatible mechanisms is given by standard
Mirrlees formula as the integral over the local incentive constraints (and information rents)
:
Z
Z Z 1
@w ( 0 ; x ( 0 )) 0
W( ),
d =
vdF (v) d 0 .
(22)
0
@ 0
x( )
The associated transfers (in the direct mechanism) are then given by
T ( ) = w ( ; x ( ))

W ( ).

Thus the transfer payment is given by
T( )=

c

Z

1

x( )

g (v) dv

Z
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0

x ( 0 ) g (x ( 0 ))

dx ( 0 ) 0
d ,
d 0

(23)

and di¤erentiating (23) with respect to
T 0 ( ) = cf (x ( ))
=

we …nd:
dx ( )
d

x ( ) f (x ( ))

dx ( )
f (x ( )) ( x ( )
d

c)

dx ( )
d
d

(24)

0,

where the inequality follows from (14) and the monotone virtual utility assumption.
(2.) We can rewrite the transfer also in terms of the threshold x ( ) or the quantity sold
Q ( ) = 1 F (x ( )), and hence P (Q ( )), and so using (24), we get
t0 (x)

dx ( )
=
d

dx ( )
f (x ( )) ( x ( )
d

c) , t0 (x) =

f (x ( )) ( x ( )

c) .

Now, the unit price per cookie sold at realization x ( ) is given by:
t0 (x ( ))
=
f (x ( ))

( x( )

c) ,

and using the solution x ( ) = v ( ) from (14), we get
t0 (x ( ))
=
f (x ( ))
Thus if

0

>

c
1 G( )
g( )

c

!

=

c 1 g(G() )
1 G( )
g( )

.

and hence x ( 0 ) < x ( ), then
t0 (x ( 0 ))
t0 (x ( ))
,
<
f (x ( ))
f (x ( 0 ))

and thus the price per cookie is decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 11. We …rst establish a property of the complete-information demands for advertising. Di¤erentiating m (q (v)) with respect to v, we obtain
dm (q (v))
dq (v)
m0 (q (v))
= m0 (q (v))
=
:
dv
dv
cm00 (q (v))
Therefore, the demand for advertising space is convex in v if m00 (q) =m0 (q) is decreasing in
q, i.e., m0 (q) is log-concave. Conversely, m (q (v)) is concave in v if m0 (q) is log-convex.
(1.) We focus on the negative-targeting case A = [v; v1 ], but all arguments immediately
extend to the case of positive targeting. Now consider the publisher’s revenues as a function
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of p:The total demand for advertising is given by
M (A) =

Z

v1

m (q (v)) dF (v) + (1

F (v1 )) m (q (v)) :

m (q (v))) f (v1 ) + (1

F (v1 )) m0 (q (v))

v

Thus, we have
@M
@v1

= (m (q (v1 ))

= f (v1 ) m (q (v1 ))

m (q (v)) +

m0 (q (v))
(v
cm00 (q (v))

@q (v) @v
@v @v1

v1 ) :

This expression is positive if and only if m00 (q) =m0 (q) is decreasing in q, i.e., if m (q (v))
is convex. Because v1 is decreasing in p, the publisher’s revenue c M is decreasing in p if
m0 (q) is log-concave.
Now consider the data provider’s revenues as a function of c: The inverse demand function
p (v1 ) is given by
p (v1 ) = (v1 ) v1 q ([v1 ; v]) + cm (q ([v1 ; v])) :
For a …xed v1 , let v^ , E [v j v > v1 ], so that q ([v1 ; v]) = q (^
v ) ; with v1 < v^. Consider the
derivative
@p (v1 ; c)
=
@c

(m (q (v1 ))

where

m (q (^
v )))

@q (^
v)
=
@c

(v1

cm0 (q (^
v )))

@q (^
v)
;
@c

m0 (q (^
v ))
:
00
cm (q (^
v ))

Using the …rst order condition v = cm0 (q (v)) we obtain
@p (v1 ; c)
= m (q (^
v ))
@c

m (q (v1 )) + (v1

m0 (q (^
v ))
:
v^)
cm00 (q (^
v ))

(25)

Notice that, as a function of v1 , the right-hand side of (25) is equal to zero if v1 = v^, and its
derivative with respect to v1 is equal to
@ 2 p (v1 ; c)
=
@v1 @c
Because

m0 (q (v1 ))

dq (v1 )
m0 (q (^
v ))
:
+
00
dv1
cm (q (^
v ))

dq (v1 )
1
=
00
dv1
cm (q (v1 ))
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we then obtain

@ 2 p (v1 ; c)
1
=
@v1 @c
c

m0 (q (^
v ))
00
m (q (^
v ))

m0 (q (v1 ))
m00 (q (v1 ))

:

(26)

Because q (v) is strictly increasing in v, if m00 (q) =m0 (q) is decreasing in q then the expression
in (26) is positive, which implies @p=@c is negative for all v1 < v^: Therefore, if m0 (q) is logconcave, the inverse demand p (v1 ; c) is strictly decreasing in c, and so are the data provider’s
pro…ts.
(2.) It is immediate to see that all results from part (1.) are reversed if m0 (q) is log-convex
(so that m00 (q) =m0 (q) is increasing in q and m (q (v)) is concave in v).
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Appendix B: Information Structures
Information Structures Each advertiser i has a compact set Vi = [0; 1] of possible valuations for the contact with the customer, where a generic element is denoted by vi 2 Vi .
The valuation vi is independently distributed with prior distribution function F (vi ), and the
associated density function g (vi ) is positive on Vi .
The signal space is denoted by Si [0; 1]. The space Si can either be countable, …nite or
in…nite, or uncountable. Let (Vi Si ; B (Vi Si )) be a measurable space, where B (Vi Si )
is the class of Borel sets of V S. An information structure for advertiser i is given by a
pair Si , hSi ; Fi (vi ; si )i, where Si is the space of signal realizations and Fi (vi ; si ) is a joint
probability distribution over the space of valuations Vi and the space of signals Si . We refer
to this class of information structures as (Borel) measurable information structures. The
joint probability distribution is de…ned in the usual way by
Fi (vi ; si ) , Pr (e
vi

vi ; sei

si ) .

The marginal distributions of Fi (vi ; si ) are denoted with minor abuse of notation by Fi (vi )
and Fi (si ) respectively. For Fi (vi ; si ) to be part of an information structure requires the
marginal distribution with respect to vi to be equal to the prior distribution over vi . The
conditional distribution functions derived from the joint distribution function are de…ned in
the usual way:
R vi
dFi ( ; si )
;
Fi (vi jsi ) , R01
dFi ( ; si )
0
and similarly,

R si

Fi (si jvi ) , R01
0

dFi (vi ; )
dFi (vi ; )

:

The data provider can choose an arbitrary information structure Si for every advertiser i
subject only to the restriction that the marginal distribution equals the prior distribution
of vi . The cost of every information structure is identical and set equal to zero. The choice
of Si is common knowledge. At the interim stage every agent observes privately a signal si
rather than her true match value vi of the object. Given the signal si and the information
structure Si each advertiser forms an estimate about her true match value. The expected
value of vi conditional on observing si is de…ned as:
wi (si ) , E [vi jsi ] =

Z

0

1

vi dFi (vi jsi ) :

Every information structure Si generates a distribution function Hi (wi ) over posterior ex43

pectations given by
Hi (wi ) =

Z

dFi (si ) .

fsi :wi (si ) wi g

We denote by Wi the support of the distribution function Hi ( ). Observe that the prior
distribution Fi ( ) and the posterior distribution over expected values Hi ( ) need not coincide.
It is helpful to illustrate some speci…c information structures.
The information structure Si yields perfect information if Fi (vi ) = Hi (vi ) for all vi 2 Vi .
In this case, the conditional distribution F (si jvi ) has to satisfy
Fi (si jvi ) =

(

0 if si < s (vi ) ;
1 if si s (vi ) ;

(27)

where s (vi ) is an invertible function.
The information structure Si is said to be positively revealing if
8
>
<

0
if 0 < v w
bi ;
Hi (v) =
Fi (b
vi ) if w
bi v vbi ;
>
:
Fi (v) if vbi v 1:

(28)

Thus, a positively revealing information structure implies Fi (vi ) = Hi (vi ) for all vi vbi 2 Vi ,
and pools all values v < v^i into the conditional expectation w
bi = E [vi jvi vbi ].
An information structure Si which satis…es (27) without necessarily satisfying the invertibility condition is called partitional. An information structure is called discrete if Si is
countable and …nite if Si is …nite.
After the choice of the information structures Si by the data provider, the induced distribution of the agent’s (expected) valuations is given by Hi (wi ) rather than Fi (vi ). The signal
si and the corresponding expected valuation wi (si ) remain private signals for every agent i
and the auctioneer still has to elicit information by respecting the truthtelling conditions.
Optimal Mechanism The data provider selects the information structures of the advertisers and a revelation mechanism. The objective of the data provider is to maximize his
expected revenue subject to the interim participation and interim incentive constraints of
the advertiser. The data provider can o¤er a menu of posterior expectations H (w j ) at a
price t ( ). In an incentive compatible mechanism the value function of an advertiser with a
willingness to pay is given by
U( ),

Z

w

fmax f w

c; 0g dH (w j )g
44

t( );

(29)

and the interim incentive constraint requires that
Z

w

fmax f w

c; 0g dH (w j )g

t( )

Z

w

fmax f w

c; 0g dH (w j 0 )g

t ( 0) ;

(30)

and the interim participation constraint requires that U ( ) 0.
For convenience, we shall restrict attention to a model with …nite values and …nite signals.
We brie‡y discuss the extension to a continuum of types, values, and signal at the end. We
present the …nite model here as it allows to avoid additional quali…cation such as “almost
surely” that arise in a model with a continuum of types, values or signals. A mechanism is
then a transfer payment t ( ) and distribution H : V ! (W ) from values into expectations.
We denote by W ( ) the set of posterior expectations under distribution H :
W ( ) , fw 2 W jh (w) > 0g :
We say that W ( ) has binary support, in this case denoted by B ( ), if it contains only two
elements:
(31)
B ( ) = fw ( ) ; w ( )g
and one of them leads to a contact, and the other one does not lead to contact: w ( )
0; w ( ) c 0.

c<

Proposition 12 (Binary Mechanism)
Every optimal revenue mechanism can be implemented by a binary mechanism.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary, and …nite, optimal mechanism fH ; t ( )g. By hypothesis it
satis…es the interim incentive constraints, that is for all types ; 0 , we have
2

U( ),4

X

w2W ( )

max f w

3

c; 0g h (w)5 t ( )

2
4

X

w2W ( 0 )

max f w

3

c; 0g h 0 (w)5 t ( 0 ) , U ( ; 0 ) .

We denote by W + ( ) the set of posterior expectations that lead to a contact with the
advertiser, or
W + ( ) , fw 2 W jh (w) > 0 ^ w c g ;
and by W ( ) the set of posterior expectations that do not lead to a contact with the
advertiser, or
W ( ) , fw 2 W jh (w) > 0 ^ w < c g :
Now, we can clearly bundle all the posterior expectations in W + ( ) and in W ( ) to obtain
a binary support as described in (31). Now clearly, under the constructed binary support,
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the indirect utility remains constants, but the value of a misreport is (weakly) smaller, that
is for all 6= 0 :
2
4

X

w2W ( 0 )

max f w

3

c; 0g h 0 (w)5

2
4

t ( 0)

X

w2B( 0 )

max f w

3

c; 0g h 0 (w)5

t ( 0) ,

after all, in the original deviation the advertiser could have acted as in the binary support,
but he had a possibly larger set of choices available to him, and hence is doing weakly worse
in the binary mechanism, i.e. the value of a misreport has been (uniformly) lowered across
all types.
By combining the posterior values into those with positive and those with negative value
relative to the type of the agent, we do not change the value of the allocation for the agent.
But, since the bundling/combination is performed with respect to the true type, it lowers
the option value for all types other than the true type, because the binary mechanism forces
them to take a constant action where before they might have chosen contingent actions.
Thus, restricting the set of posterior realization only tightens the incentive constraints, and
can only (weakly) improve the revenues for the principal.
Finally, Proposition 12 implies that every revenue-optimal mechanism can be implemented through a mechanism resembling cookie sales. In particular, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 (Noiseless Information Policy) Every revenue-optimal mechanism can be
implemented by a noiseless information policy.
Intuitively, a noiseless information policy combines all posterior values with negative value
into a single signal. As in Proposition 12, this does not change the value of the resulting
allocation, but weakly lowers the value of any deviation. Therefore, the data provider can
maximize revenues by revealing cookies above the optimal threshold in (14) and charging
the corresponding prices.
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